Ockham's Razor: an interesting way to define "logical"

Wow. I can't even tell you how oft I have been given the following as an assumption in an argument: "Given any two explanations of a phenomenon, the simpler of the two will be the correct one". You've seen this guy lurking around the corner, just outside the circle of lamplight, right? It's not word-for-word, of course (I'm pretty sure it would be in Latin if anyone wanted to catch me on that point; how's your Latin, these days?), but this is one of the fundamental maxims of Modern Science. It stands right there next to the idea that the universe must lay bare all its secrets before man once man has figured out how to ask the right questions, and its sister notion that all things can be described mathematically.
Perhaps you noticed my majiscules up there and wondered why I used "Modern Science" as opposed to "modern science". These two, I think, are demonstrably separable schools of thought. Having promised demonstrability, please permit me to demonstrate.
Why must Ockham's Razor stand with the rules of truth-functional, or even first-order, logic? Why is it inherently as true as the law of excluded middle (you must have p or not p; never both, never neither. Schroedinger's cat is a famous paradox that demonstrates an absurdity in quantum mechanics, namely that the famous feline must be both living and dead until observed; a violation of this logical law.)?
Sometimes we forget that there are two kinds of logic in this wild and wacky world of ours. The first is the math kind: first order logic, which employs a good deal of truth-functional logic. It's good stuff; I'm a huge fan. It is not necessarily an accurate way of describing anything aside from p's and q's, however. Chinese Daoism rejects this kind of logic as a way to describe, for example, reality (at least, it used to. I have to admit that I haven't read anything but the Dao de jing, and that mostly through a translation. I admit that I'm uncertain what modern Daoists are saying).
The other kind of logic is the kind that humans use. We call it informal logic. I like this kind, too, but it is a different kind of logic. If Ockham's Razor were a product, this would be its brand. Informal logic is what we use when we can't prove absolutely whether an idea is true or false, but all the evidence seems to point toward one side of the other. This is the kind of logic used in a court of law. The only way to prove absolutely that a crime took place would be to have all people everywhere see it happen. Even that might not be proof! The universe is a strange place; I've seen a guy pull a coin out of a little girl's ear, you know. I'm just saying that human beings, as fallible and non-omniscient beings, sometimes get tricked, confused or otherwise miss some of the facts in a judgement of verity. Informal logic is for those who are less interested in p's and q's as they are in what the most likely (though not irrefutably certain) answer to a real question is.
Both varieties of logic must, if we want a nice, clean game of it, acknowledge their boundaries. Formal, first order logic can assure us whether abstract things are true of false. David Hume proved pretty conclusively, I think, that first order logic can't actually step into the informal logic realm and deal with real-world events. If you have ever heard that correlation does not imply causation, this is where it came from. Informal logic, likewise, cannot step into the realm of the formal and use our best judgement to demonstrate universal truths. If you don't believe me, use your intuition instead of algebra on your next math test. I'd like to hear how it goes.
Scientists (you can't tell because of English orthographical rules about the beginnings of sentences, but that's the kind of scientists with a leading miniscule) take a look at the world, look at their two kinds of logic, and say, "I can't use these to figure out that. At least, not for sure. What I can do is watch the universe go by and look for patterns. When I see a pattern, I'll try to come up with a reason for it." Ockham's Razor says that it makes sense that the simplest answer should be the correct one, and so the scientist won't waste time coming up with a more elaborate reason for what's going on. Ultimately, he knows, he cannot really decide why something is the way it is for certain, and so he may as well use the simplest models to avoid confusion.
Modern Scientists (that's the majiscule variety now) lift Ockham's Razor into the realm or formal logic, and in so doing deify math. Who wants math as a god? Well, if you're looking for a belief system without moral constraints, this is the one to go with. Making the assumption that Ockham's Razor is a statement of verifiable fact (it isn't, which is problematic for me, but let's pretend), it only makes sense that math can unerringly prove what is true. With this method of reasoning, we can elevate all informal logic to the level of the formal kind. Well now we know everything! The problem is that Ockham's Razor is not a statement of verifiable fact. You cannot prove that things don't happen for a more complicated reason than is immediately apparent. You cannot prove that there aren't things happening behind the scenes in the universe. You can't even prove that math describes anything in the real world! Now these are very attractive ideas, and they sing a lovely Siren's song. If you want to play at logic with the big boys, though, you can't have them. You must always remember that the universe is big enough for surprises. Socrates was right on at least one point. We are truly wise when we know that we know nothing.